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Abstract
Payment channel networks (PCN) have been introduced to solve scalability problem of permis-
sionless blockchains such as Bitcoin. The Lightning Network (LN), launched in 2018, is the most
prominent PCN built on top of Bitcoin. As of March 2020, LN consists of over 11 thousand nodes
and 36 thousand channels, collectively holding nearly 900 bitcoins (7.8M USD).
A payment channel allows two parties to lock funds in a multisignature address and then modify
the distribution of funds in nearly instant transactions, without confirming them in the blockchain. As
LN transactions are not broadcast and not publicly stored, LN has been seen not only as scalability but
also as privacy solution. The protocol guarantees that only the latest channel state can be confirmed
on channel closure. LN also supports multi-hop payments, where the balances of multiple channels
along a path are moved. The atomicity of this process is guaranteed by hash time-locked contracts
(HTLC). LN nodes gossip about channels available for routing and their total capacities. To issue a
(multi-hop) payment, the sender creates a route based on its local knowledge of the graph. As local
channel balances are not public, payments often fail due to insufficient balance at an intermediary
hop. In that case, the payment is attempted along multiple routes until it succeeds. This constitutes
a privacy-efficiency tradeoff: hidden balances improve privacy but hinder routing efficiency.
In this work, we show that an attacker can easily discover channel balances using probing. This
takes under a minute per channel and requires moderate capital commitment and no expenditures
(the attacker’s funds are only temporarily locked). We describe the algorithm and test our proof-
of-concept implementation on Bitcoin’s testnet. We argue that LN’s balance between privacy and
routing efficiency is suboptimal: channel balances are neither well protected nor utilized.
We outline two ways for LN to evolve in respect to this issue. To emphasize privacy, we propose
a modification of error handling that hides details of the erring channel from the sending node. This
would break our probing technique but make routing failures more common, as the sender would not
know which channel from the attempted route has failed. To improve efficiency, we propose a new
API call that would let the sender query balances of channels that it is not a party of. We argue
that combining these approaches can help LN take the best of both worlds: hide private data when
feasible, and utilize public data for higher routing efficiency.
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ity, privacy, probing
∗sergey.s.tikhomirov@gmail.com
†rene.m.pickhardt@ntnu.no
‡alex.biryukov@uni.lu
§mariusz.nowostawski@ntnu.no
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
4.
00
33
3v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
 A
pr
 20
20
1 Introduction
Bitcoin [15] is the first digital currency to solve the
double spending problem without a trusted third
party. The permissionless nature of Bitcoin’s con-
sensus algorithm imposes severe restrictions on trans-
action throughput, with a theoretical maximum of
tens of transactions per second [9]. Addressing this
problem in a naive way (such as increasing the block
size) would endanger Bitcoin’s key properties, such
as the ability of participants to validate all trans-
actions in real time using consumer hardware. An-
other scaling approach that doesn’t affect Bitcoin’s
properties but builds on top of them is off-chain
scaling. Off-chain, or second layer (L2 ) protocols
allow parties to exchange transactions without broad-
casting them to the blockchain, but in case of a con-
flict the blockchain (called layer one in this context)
is used for dispute resolution. We refer the reader
to a comprehensive overview of off-chain approaches
in [11].
The (Lightning Network) LN has gained signif-
icant traction as a major Bitcoin scaling solution.
First introduced in 2016 [20] and launhed on main-
net in early 2018, it is being implemented by sev-
eral independent teams based on a common set of
specifications called BOLTs (for Basics of Lightning
Technology).
The basic building block of LN is a payment
channel. A payment channel is a protocol for off-
chain transactions based on the initial funding trans-
action, which locks coins in a 2-of-2 multisignature
address. A channel operates in three stages: open-
ing (two parties lock the coins), operating (exchang-
ing off-chain transactions), and closing (broadcast-
ing the most recent channel state to the blockchain).
A channel partner may try to cheat by trying to
close the channel with an earlier state. In this case,
the counterparty is guaranteed to get all funds from
the channel if they react within a timeout.
LN nodes gossip about newly opened channels
that are marked as available for routing. Based on
this information, each node maintains a local view
of the network, and uses it to calculate routes to
the receiver. As total channel capacities are known,
the sender only considers channels with the capacity
larger than X for a payment of amount X. How-
ever, this is insufficient to prevent routing failures,
because the distribution of funds in channels is not
known. The ability of channel parties to send or
forward payments is limited by their local channel
balances. Initially, if Alice opens a channel with
Bob, all funds are on her side. This means that she
can send up to the total capacity, but she can not
receive. As the local balances change, the routing
capabilities of the channels in both directions are
also changing.
In case of payment failure, the sender is notified
by an error message which channel has failed, and
will presumably re-launch route generation func-
tion with the failed channel excluded. This pro-
cedure repeats for a pre-set number of tries, or un-
til a payment succeeds. Given the external con-
straints it is sill not clear that a better approach
than systematically probing for paths exist even
though active research is being conducted in this
area [6, 10,16,17,19,21,23,24].
Another aspect of LN relevant for this work is
privacy. Bitcoin is pseudonymous: while blockchain
addresses are not linked to real world identity, and
users are encouraged to not reuse them, the transac-
tion graph can be extracted and analyzed. In con-
trast, LN payments are only sent to a short chain
of randomly chosen nodes along the route from a
sender to a receiver. Due to onion routing, each
intermediary node only knows the previous and the
next hops, but not the whole route and even not its
position in the route. This supports the presump-
tion that Lightning payments provide more privacy
than layer-one Bitcoin transactions. However, a
probing attack described in [26] showed that it is
possible for an attacker to reveal balances of other
channels of their channel partner.
We see an important tradeoff in LN between
routing efficiency and privacy. On the one hand,
hiding balances from everyone but channel parties
is an important privacy measure. If an external ob-
server could probe intermediate channel balances,
it would be possible to track payments from the
sender to the receiver, thereby breaking relationship
anonymity and value privacy (as defined e.g. in [13]).
On the other hand, knowing channel balances would
allow senders to avoid trying routes that will fail.
We argue that LN in the current form takes ”the
worst of both worlds”: information about channel
balances is neither well protected nor utilized. We
support the first part of this claim by describing
a probing algorithm that reveals channel balances
by sending fake payments. Contrary to [26], which
requires opening channels with both parties of the
channel that is being probed, our approach allows
to probe the whole network while only establish-
ing a handful of channels. This greatly reduces the
cost of the attack. We test our proof-of-concept
implementation on Bitcoin testnet and successfully
probe a significant portion of channels with high
precision. We also outline potential countermea-
sures. We leave the formal treatment of the second
part of the claim (how utilizing balance information
would improve routing) for future work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, we describe the relevant aspects of LN
in more detail. In Section 3, we introduce our prob-
ing algorithm. In Section 4, we describe the exper-
imental results. We discuss the results and propose
countermeasures in Section 5. Section 6 provides a
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short summary of related work, and Section 7 con-
cludes.
2 Background
In this section, we introduce the basic concepts of
the LN and the details relevant for our work.
Each LN node is defined by a private-public
key pair. A node has a permanent identifier and
connects to other nodes in the LN P2P network.
Nodes exchange information about the currently
open channels and their fee policies. Nodes com-
municate with an underlying bitcoin node (such as
Bitcoin Core) to receive information on which trans-
actions are confirmed.
To create an LN channel, Alice issues a request
to Bob via the P2P protocol. If the parties agree on
channel parameters, they co-sign a funding trans-
action that establishes the initial distribution of
funds. While in the initial specifications it was as-
sumed that both parties could fund a channel, the
current LN channels are single-funded (i.e., Alice
provides all funds and may optionally ”push” some
funds to Bob as a gift). After the funding trans-
action gets the sufficient number of confirmations
(usually 3 to 6), the channel is open.
An LN transaction is an atomic update of one
or multiple channels. To send a payment to Bob,
Alice negotiates a new channel state. Each channel
state is reflected in a commitment transaction – a
bitcoin transaction that spends the funding trans-
action and distributes the funds to both parties in
some proportion. Outputs of commitment trans-
actions are called Hash time-locked contracts, or
HTLC s. HTLC is defined by a Bitcoin script that
gives the funds either to one party, if it provides a
pre-image of a given hash, or to the other party af-
ter a timeout. For instance, if Alice wants to send
x coins to Bob, she first asks him for a payment
hash. Bob generates a random number r and send
its hash H(r) to Alice in a message called an in-
voice. Alice then offers Bob an HTLC that would
give him x coins if he provides a preimage of H(r)
before time t, or return the coins to Alice otherwise.
Bob must claim the payment before time t. If he
provides r, the HTLC resolves: the balances in the
next commitment transaction outputs will reflect
the new distribution of channel funds. The other
way for an HTLC to be resolved is timeout. A pay-
ment channel can keep track of multiple unresolved
HTLCs concurrently.
LN is source routed. Nodes exchange informa-
tion about channels, and each node chooses routes
based on the local view of the network graph. The
graph includes total channel capacities but not lo-
cal balances of the counterparties. Using HTLCs
enables atomicity of channel updates in multi-path
transactions. For instance, Alice can pay Charlie
via Bob by using the same hash value along the
route. If Charlie redeems the payment from Bob,
then Bob can use the same pre-image to claim funds
from Alice, otherwise no funds move.
The cornerstone of LN security is its revocation
mechanism. The party that initiates the channel
closure must wait until their portion of the funds
becomes available. For instance, if Alice initiates a
channel closure, she must wait until her funds be-
come available. If the closure is a cheating attempt,
Bob can dispute it before the timeout and take con-
trol of all channel funds.
Multi-path payments use onion routing to en-
force the order of intermediary nodes. Each HTLC
is onion-encrypted so that each intermediary node
only knows the immediate previous and next nodes,
but not the final sender or receiver. Transaction
fees are collected by intermediary nodes as a differ-
ence between the amount in the HTLC they receive
and the HTLC they send as part of the same trans-
action. Note that if a payment fails, no fees are
collected, as all pending balance updates roll back.
3 Probing algorithm
We describe our algorithm of channel probing.
Let us denote the total capacity of a channel
as c. The two parties of a channel are denoted as
source (with balance bs) and destination (bd). As
per BOLT specification, the source is defined as the
node with an alphanumerically smaller node ID. For
concreteness, for each channel, we estimate the bal-
ance at source (bs), and refer to it simply as b.
First, we establish the list of channels we are go-
ing to probe. To be suitable for probing, the chan-
nel must be active (available for routing) and live
(responding to requests). As a P2P network, LN
has no definitive list of live nodes. Therefore, we
need heuristics to choose live channels for probing.
Probing dead channels would be wasteful: we would
have to wait for timeouts, and the probes would
leave our channels with ”hanging” HTLCs waiting
to be redeemed, occupying our capacity.
We define a channel as active if it is marked as
active in at least one of the two directions (this in-
formation is available in gossip data). To determine
liveness, we use two heuristics: temporarily con-
necting to all nodes, and sending a small amount
to all active channels (pre-probing). After com-
piling a list of live and active channels, we probe
them by sending payments with randomly gener-
ated payment hashes. We refer to such payments
as probes. For each channel, we keep a lower (bmin)
and an upper (bmax) bound for its balance b. Ini-
tially, bmin = 0 and bmax = c. At each probing
step, we aim at shrinking this interval by issuing a
probe with the amount of 0.5∗(bmin+bmax) (binary
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search).1
The two directions of a channel can have dif-
ferent properties. Each channel partner controls
its channel direction: Alice sets the routing pol-
icy only in the direction to Bob, while Bob sets the
policy only in the direction to Alice. It is possible
that a channel is only partially active: Alice allows
routing to Bob, but Bob does not allow routing to
Alice. Therefore, we try probing each channel in
both directions, taking advantage of the fact that
the two local balances sum up to the channel capac-
ity: bs+bd = c. This helps us probe partially active
channels. It is also helpful for probing large chan-
nels: if we do not have enough capacity to probe
a channel from the ”large” end, we probe it from
the ”small” end, getting the same information. For
clarity, we omit this implementation detail from the
algorithm description.
We now describe our probing technique more
thoroughly.
3.1 Selecting channels for probing
We use the following heuristics to determine liveness
(Algorithm 1).
3.1.1 Heuristic 1: Connecting to nodes
For a channel to be live, both its parties must be
live. We extract a list of nodes from gossip data and
establish a P2P connection to each.2 We consider
a channel live, if both its parties are live.
3.1.2 Heuristic 2: Pre-probing
To further optimize probing, we introduce an addi-
tional pre-probing step. We send a probe of 1000 satoshis
to every channel marked as active in the gossip data.
If we get an error of one of the two types that we use
for probing, we consider the channel live, otherwise
we consider it dead an do not consider it it in the
main probing step. We start the first main round
of probing with a list of live channels where a chan-
nel is defined live if either heuristic 1 or heuristic 2
detected it as live.
3.1.3 Heuristic 3: Liveness detected during
probing
If we issue a probe along the route of channels c1, c2, . . . , cn
and receive an error from channel ci, we conclude
that all channels cj , j <= i are live. If any of cj
is not on our live channels list, we add it. During
the second probing round, we use the updated live
channels list.
1If the midpoint between bmin and bmax is larger than
the maximum HTLC amount allowed by the specification,
we decrease it to that maximum minus a safety margin.
2Establishing a P2P connection is nearly instant and does
not require coins, unlike opening a channel.
Data: Gossip data
Result: Channels selected for probing
for node in gossip data do
connect to node;
if connection established then
add node to live nodes;
end
end
for channel in gossip data do
if source and destination in live nodes
then
add channel to channels to probe;
end
end
for channel in gossip data do
send a 1000 sat probe;
if error returned then
add channel to channels to probe;
end
end
Algorithm 1: Select channels for probing
3.1.4 Channel order
Our method is agnostic to the order in which the
channels are probed. However we probe the ”closer”
and ”more important” channels first. The rationale
behind this is that knowing the balances of channels
often used as intermediary hops allows us to avoid
sending payments that are known to fail early due
to insufficient balance at some hop (note that the
standard routing does not know about the funds
distribution within channels). We refer to the nodes
we open channels with as entry nodes. We probe
channels in the following order:
• the ”first layer” – channels adjacent to the
entry nodes;
• channels between hubs – channels connecting
nodes out of 1% of the most connected nodes
(if not already probed);
• the ”second layer” – channels adjacent to the
”first layer” (if not already probed);
• other channels (if not already probed).
3.2 Probing
3.2.1 Probing a single channel
The key idea behind our method is that by sending
a payment of amount a to a channel, we can use
the type or error it returns to infer whether its bal-
ance is higher or lower than a. We use a randomly
generated value as a payment hash, therefore, the
payment fails in any case. Let c1, c2, . . . , cn be a
route we use, and bi be their respective balances.
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Let cj be the erring channel. After each probe with
an amount a, we obtain the following information:
• bi > a for i < j;
• bj < a if the error is ”insufficient capacity”, or
bj > a if the error is ”unknown preimage”
3.
The probing algorithm for a single route is pre-
sented in Algorithm 2.
Data: Route and amount to probe
Result: Updated balance estimates for
channels in route
send payment along route;
for channels before erring channel do
bmin = a;
end
for erring channel do
if insufficient funds then
bmax = a;
end
if unknown preimage then
bmin = a;
end
end
Algorithm 2: Update balance estimates for
channels along a route
The algorithm for all channels selected for prob-
ing is presented in Algorithm 3.
Data: Gossip data
Result: Improved estimates for channels
get channels for probing;
for channel in channels for probing do
bmin = 0;
bmax = c;
for number of probings per channel do
for number of attempts per probing do
get route to target;
probe route;
if target channel estimates updated
then
continue;
end
end
if required precision reached then
continue;
end
end
end
Algorithm 3: Probe all channels
3.2.2 Choosing routes
We rely on the built-in functionality of our LN node
to calculate routes to target channels. Additionally,
3The latter is only possible if j = n.
we pre-filter suggested routes based on the informa-
tion we have obtained through probing. If we know
that a balance of some channel in a suggested route
is insufficient, we exclude such channel from con-
sideration for the current probe and repeat route
search (Algorithm 4).
Optimizing route length presents a trade-off. Choos-
ing longer routes allows to collect more information
per probe, but we are less likely to reach the target
channel, as the probability that some intermediary
channel fails is higher. For our purposes, we limit
the length of routes to 10 hops (the protocol limit
is 20 hops).
Data: target channel, amount a
Result: Route to target suitable for a
for channels adjacent to destination do
if channel is not target then
add channel to excluded channels;
end
end
for all channels do
if a > cmax then
add channel to excluded channels;
end
end
while route is bad do
get route to target without excluded
channels;
for channel in route do
if a > bmax then
route is bad;
end
end
route is good;
end
return route;
Algorithm 4: Find a suitable route to target
channel and given amount
3.2.3 Second probing pass
We discovered that some channels we thought were
dead are in fact live, as our payments were suc-
cessfully routed through them (liveness heuristic 3
described earlier). We mark such channels as live
and repeat the probing the second time taking them
into consideration.
3.3 Channel information coefficient
To measure the effectiveness of our technique, we
introduce the channel information coefficient. For
a given channel, it is defined as:
i = 1− bmax − bmin
c
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where c is the original channel capacity, and
bmax and bmin are our upper and lower bound es-
timates for b. Thus i = 0 would mean that we do
not know any extra information about b compared
to public knowledge. The value i = 1 means that
we know b precisely. In practice, if no unexpected
error occurs, after 7 probings we shrink the interval
between the minimum and the maximum estimates
to 1/128 of the initial estimates, that is, we deter-
mine the channel balance with the precision better
than 1%.
3.4 Implementation details
We implemented the algorithm described in Sec-
tion 3 as a c-lightning plugin. C-lightning [2] is one
of the three major LN implementations, alongside
LND [3] and Eclair [1]. The plugin functionality al-
lows developers to integrate their code in Python
with the c-lightning node [5]. We used five en-
try channels opened to handpicked nodes with high
connectivity and liquidity. Four of our channels had
the maximum allowed capacity of 0.167 BTC, and
one channel had the capacity of 0.043 BTC.
Ethical considerations
For ethical reasons and to be in compliance with
privacy-related regulations, we only collected data
from Bitcoin testnet.
4 Results
4.1 State of Bitcoin testnet
At the time of the experiment (2020-02-26), Bit-
coin testnet contained 1974 nodes and 5884 chan-
nels (including 2527 announced as active). The ini-
tial estimate showed that 207 nodes and 1625 chan-
nels were live. We detected 3 additional live chan-
nels during the main probing phase. The strongly
connected component of the live subgraph contained
1489 channels. The other 139 channels where point-
ing towards nodes for which we could not get mean-
ingful error messages.
4.2 Conducting the probing
We launched the code that implements the algo-
rithm described in Section 3.
In total we sent out 12895 onions: 3153 (24.45%)
during the pre-probing and 9742 (75.55%) during
the main probing). Out of 9742 onions in the main
probing, 8256 (84.75%) returned errors which we
could use to improve the estimates of balances on
payment channels (namely, ”channel temporary un-
available”, which we interpret as ”insufficient bal-
ance”, and ”payment details unknown”, which we
interpret as ”preimage unknown”). Our code was
Figure 1: Distribution of probing timings on an
onion level also drilled down depending on the dis-
tance in the route where the onion failed.
running for 14 hours and 6 minutes. Probing 1628
live channels took 65% of the time (roughly 9 hours),
while the rest of the time was spent on slow re-
sponding channels or channels which replied with
an unexpected error.
4.3 Probing parameters
One of the decisions we had to make is to set a time-
out after which we declare a channel unresponsive
and move to the next one. The LN protocol does
not prescribe how quickly a node should react. The
only time limitation is the HTLC timeout, which is
usually on the order of hours or days. Therefore,
to probe all channels in reasonable time, we has to
set a timeout on the order of seconds. For the main
probing, we choose a 10 seconds timeout. Our later
results show that this is a reasonable tradeoff be-
tween probing speed and accuracy.
4.4 Distribution of probing times
Figure 1 shows the distribution of probing times for
various route lengths. Nearly all onions of 1, 2 or
3 hops return within 10 seconds. The median of
the 8256 onions is at 3.36 seconds. Recalling that
15.25% of the onions timed out or gave a non us-
able error back, we computed the corrected median
without the timed out and erring onions, which is
3.93 seconds. We conclude that the cutoff at 10
seconds is an acceptable tradeoff. Note that the di-
ameter of the strongly connected component on the
LN is just 3.4
4Note however, that it is often impossible to use the short-
est route, as it may not have sufficient balances in all channels
on the side of the sender.
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Figure 2: Distribution of probing timings on a chan-
nel level
4.5 Time to probe a channel
We look at the cumulative distribution function of
times spent on channels in Figure 2.
All channels can be probed within 1 minute.
This is very plausible considering the timeout of
10 seconds for onions and the fact that we did only
7 steps in binary search, so the expected worst case
probing time is 70 seconds. However it is very un-
likely that we have 7 onions which are all short be-
low 10 seconds. We furthermore observe that 50%
of channels can be probed in less than 21.2 seconds.
4.6 Probing results
We used the channel information coefficient as in-
troduced in Figure 3 to measure how much infor-
mation we obtained for all the channels that we
probed. We separated the channels into small and
large channels. We labeled as small channels those
with capacity less then two times the maximum
HTLC value (i.e. up to 2 ∗ 0.043 = 0.086 BTC).
Small channels could be at least theoretically fully
probed.
We obtained full information about the chan-
nel balance on over 1000 of 1628 channels. Also we
note the jump at 0.5 for the large channels. This
is expected, as large channels have roughly 4 times
the capacity of the maximum HTLC amount limit,
therefore if we probe 25% from each side, this leaves
us with a channel information coefficient of 0.5 for
the channels that have more than 25% of the ca-
pacity on either side.
The notion of channels being balanced is impor-
tant for LN. Intuitively, a channel is balanced if it
has roughly comparable balances on either side. If
the two balances differ significantly, the channel is
unbalanced. We introduce the balance coefficient to
quantify this. The balance coefficient represents the
distance from the actual channel balance to 0.5 of
the total capacity, where b is the estimated local
Figure 3: Distribution how often channel informa-
tion coefficients shows that we can reveal full bal-
ance information for a majority of the attacked
channels.
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Figure 4: A large portion of channels is unbalanced
(coefficient close to zero).
balance and c is the total channel capacity:
cbal = 0.5− |b− c|
c
cbal = 0 means the channel is unbalanced: all
balance is on one side. cbal = 1 means the channel
is perfectly balanced: there are equal local balances
on both sides. Figure 4 depicts the distribution of
balance coefficients among ”small” channels that we
were able to probe with high accuracy (information
coefficient > 0.9). We do not include large channels
in this figure, because for many of them we can not
precisely estimate the balance, hence they would
appear perfectly balanced in the figure. We con-
clude that many channels are indeed unbalanced:
15% have the balance coefficient lower than 0.001,
45% lower than 0.01, and 62% lower than 0.1. Note,
however, that the picture may change if we consider
large channels, and that channel management prac-
tices on mainnet may differ significantly.
Finally, we wanted to understand how often we
send onions through each channel. As Figure 5
shows, most of our routes go through a small num-
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Figure 5: Distribution how often channels have
been used in routes seems to follow a power law.
ber of channels. It is partially explained by the
fact that all routes by definition pass through one
of our own entry channels. We suggest that this
distribution, which seems to follow the power law,
is consistent with the properties of a small world
network with a small diameter.
5 Discussion and countermea-
sures
Our experiments show that channel balances can
not be considered private data. The current ap-
proach to managing balance information is neither
used to optimize routing, not protected properly.
We envision two paths for LN development with ei-
ther privacy or routing efficiency prioritized. We
outline potential countermeasures and leave their
full development and evaluation for future work.
5.1 Without protocol modification
We envision one countermeasure that would par-
tially mitigate the current probing technique. This
can be implemented as part of a node routing pol-
icy. Note that all our payments used for probing
fail (by design, either due to insufficient balance or
due to intentionally wrong hash value). Interme-
diary nodes know if a payment they are a part of
succeeds or fails. Therefore, an intermediary node
observing a flood of failing payments from the same
channel may assume that this is a probing, espe-
cially if the amounts follow the binary search pat-
tern. Of course, such techniques can be tricked: an
adversary can connect to Bob via Alice and make
Bob think that Alice is malicious and is measuring
his channel balance.
5.2 Prioritizing privacy
We argue that it is infeasible to reliably protect bal-
ance information of LN channels. This conclusion
comes from the following observations:
• The sender knows whether the payment has
failed or succeeded;
• The sender knows which channel has failed if
the payment has failed.
However, we can modify the protocol to make
the latter assumption to not hold.
5.2.1 Merging error types
To preserve privacy, we propose a modification to
LN error handling.
The problem is that the two erring cases we dis-
tinguish differ in both the erring node and the error
type. In particular, if the target channel has insuffi-
cient capacity, the error is returned by the previous
node. If the target channel has enough capacity,
then the final recipient reports incorrect payment
details.
The goal of the proposed changes is to prevent
the sender from knowing where the payment has
failed. In particular, we propose that each node in
a route modifies the error it sends back as if it has
originated from its own channel. We also suggest
merging the two error types (”incorrect or unknown
payment details” and ”temporary channel failure”).
A similar countermeasure has already been imple-
mented (see note about error types 16 and 17 in
BOLT4 [4]). The drawback of this method is a de-
crease in payment reliability: as the sender does
not know which channel has failed the payment,
this channel can not be excluded in the subsequent
route search.
5.2.2 Additional loops
Another potential countermeasure would be for in-
termediary nodes to add extra hops to the route.
Currently LN is source-routed: the route is chosen
by the sender and enforced with onion routing. In-
termediary nodes can not change the sequence of
nodes that a payment goes through (though they
can choose a channel to the next node, if multiple
channels are available). If this scheme is modified,
instead of offering an HTLC to Bob directly as pre-
scribed by the initial sender, and intermediary node
Alice would forward the payment to Bob through
a random sub-route via Charlie and David. This
would blur the picture for the sender, as the sender
wouldn’t know which path the payment has really
taken.
Possible drawbacks of this approach include a
more complex fee structure and the requirement to
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substantially modify the onion routing protocol in
the current LN.
5.2.3 JIT routing
JIT routing can be an effective countermeasure against
channel probing attacks.
Just In Time Routing (JIT-routing) algorithm
was originally proposed to improve payment relia-
bility [17]. In JIT routing, forwarding nodes send a
circular payment to themselves if the balance of a
channel is insufficient to forward a payment (chan-
nel rebalancing). In the probing scenario, a JIT-
supporting node will not send an error message back
if it is lacking funds on the attacked (probed) chan-
nel. Rather, it will interrupt the routing process,
rebalance its channels, and continue forwarding the
payment. The attacker would interpret this as a sig-
nal that the target channel has sufficient funds (the
same holds if the channel is probed from the other
side). The task now is to ensure that rebalancing
is always be successful. This can be established by
ensuring that the max flow in the network is suffi-
cient.
As JIT routing takes additional time, there is a
possibility for a timing attack. However, the at-
tacker has no control over where on the probed
path JIT routing operations take place. We leave
the evaluation of this proposal for future work. We
suggest to start by looking at the proactive chan-
nel rebalancing proposal [19] that can be reused to
engage in various JIT-routing strategies.
5.3 Prioritizing routing efficiency
If one concludes that it is infeasible to protect chan-
nel balances, then one may decide not to consider
this information secret and utilize it to improve
routing efficiency.
A common cause for routing failure in LN is the
lack of balance information at the sender’s node.
Routes are chosen under the assumption that a chan-
nel with capacity c can route payments up to c,
which is very optimistic. The sender could filter
out unsuitable routes if it knows the balances of all
channels (as we do in Algorithm 4). Broadcasting
all intermediate balances to all nodes is unfeasible,
as it would introduce a large networking overhead
and structurally replicate the layer one (Bitcoin)
gossip, where each transaction must reach every
node. This puts severe limitations on layer one scal-
ability, which is the very problem LN is meant to
solve.
We propose to develop reasonable means for nodes
to share information about balances with other nodes,
that does not overwhelm the network. This infor-
mation would help nodes make better path-finding
decisions or recognize how to allocate their funds to
newly created payment channels.
5.3.1 Sharing balance data
Instead of sharing all the balances, we propose adding
an API call that would let the sender query the
balance of a channel it wants to route a payment
through. In this scenario, a sender would create a
preliminary route and query the nodes along this
route on whether they have sufficient balance. If
some of them do not, the sender re-calculates the
route until a suitable route is found. This would
eliminate or at least improve upon the current LN
payment workflow, where a sender is receiving er-
rors and re-sending a payment along multiple routes
until it succeeds. Nodes could come up with policies
regarding balances, for instance, only reveal bal-
ances to trusted nodes, or only to nodes that pay a
fee. The ability of a node to reveal a channel bal-
ance for routing purposes may also be subject to
negotiation between channel partners during chan-
nel establishment. We should also think about ways
to prevent abuse of this system. We leave a more
detailed analysis of this proposal and the evaluation
of its efficiency to future work.
5.4 Limitations
Now we discuss the limitations of our approach and
potential ways to improve it.
5.4.1 Inactive channels
We can only probe channels that allow routing through
them (i.e., active channels). The routing function
does not consider channels marked as not active.
5.4.2 Private channels
LN channels do not have to be announced. In par-
ticular, casual users on mobile devices are not sup-
posed to announce their channels. These channels
are called private. According to a recent study [22],
28% of LN channels are private. Private channels
are not prone to our probing methodology.
It may be possible to extend our technique to
private channels by using on-chain heuristics to lo-
cate them. In particular, each channel has a short
ID composed of the number of the block, the trans-
action, and the UTXO index of the funding trans-
action. Scanning the blockchain for the outputs
of the corresponding form and cross-referencing it
with the LN gossip may show private channels. This
attack has been reported and is in the process of be-
ing mitigated [18].
5.4.3 No route for the required amount
We can not probe a route if we could not find a
suitable route to a target channel. In particular,
we can not probe a high-capacity channel if it is
connected to the rest of the network only through
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a low-capacity channel. This limitation can be par-
tially overcome by diverging from the series of prob-
ing amounts determined by binary search (where
each new amount divides [bmin, bmax] in half). In-
stead, we could probe such channels with a smaller
amount. In the initial version of our algorithm, we
did not do it for simplicity. In any case, our prob-
ing capacity for the high-capacity target channel is
limited by the capacity of (smaller) intermediary
channels.
5.4.4 Error types
Our interpretation of error messages may not al-
ways be correct. For instance, ”temporary channel
failure” can be caused by other failures apart from
insufficient capacity. Moreover, some of the chan-
nels respond with errors that we interpret as nei-
ther ”insufficient capacity” nor ”unknown preim-
age”. Interpreting errors more accurately may im-
prove the results. This can be achieved by inspect-
ing the source code of LN implementations and un-
derstanding exactly under which circumstances each
error type is returned.
5.4.5 Concurrency, large channels, and prob-
ing time
Our algorithm prescribes that each next probing
amount cuts [bmin, bmax] in half. For large channels,
this is not always possible, as our current method
only sends out one HTLC at a time to a specific
route.
Lightning implementations impose limits on the
maximal amount transferred in one HTLC. This
amount is approximately 0.043 BTC.5 The total
channel capacity also has a soft limit of 0.167 BTC.6
This means that we can not perform the initial
probe (with the amount c/2) on channels larger
than 0.086 BTC. For such channels, we decrease
the first probing amount to the maximum HTLC
amount minus a safety margin. 7 If the capacity
distribution is more unequal than around 1:3, we
can continue probing, otherwise we admit that the
true capacity distribution is in the interval which
we can not probe with one HTLC.
However one can overcome this limitation by
probing such channels with multiple concurrent HTLCs.
Our current algorithm is not concurrent, because we
only control the sender, but not the receiver. There-
fore, if the receiver is live, an error returns quickly,
54294967295 millisatoshis.
6A soft limit means that it is a default restriction in the
implementations, a node administrator can manually over-
ride it and open a larger channel is the counterparty agrees.
7Trying to probe with exactly the maximum amount lead
to errors, as we must also account for fees and possible safety
margins at other nodes. In our code, we use the local maxi-
mum HTLC amount of 0.042 BTC.
and the capacity is unblocked. To probe large chan-
nels, we need to block funds for longer. This would
involve a modified node acting as the recipient and
deliberately delaying sending back an error, thus
temporarily blocking funds along the route in an
series of in-flight HTLCs. This would allow us to
have more precise lower bound estimates, in partic-
ular for large and distant channels.
The probing takes a noticeable amount of time
(a few hours, depending on parameters). Assuming
that the usage of LN is not very high, we assume
that the effect on our results is low. But strictly
speaking, our results do not constitute an instant
snapshot of the network. This limitation can also
be overcome by concurrent probing.
However, adding concurrency is a non trivial
task, as parallel probings may interfere with each
other. For example, if a channel with a balance X
is concurrently probed with amount 0.7X by two
probing instances, it would return ”insufficient ca-
pacity” to one of them, though it could have for-
warded two probes of 0.7X each sequentially. It
is possible to parallelize the probing, but one has
to ensure that the parallel probing agents do not
interfere with each other.
5.4.6 Parallel channels and non-strict for-
warding
Our method is based on an assumption that the
payment is being forwarded through the channels as
determined by the sender. However, the LN speci-
fication only guarantees that the sequence of nodes
is followed. We denote channels shared by the same
pair of nodes as parallel. A forwarding node is free
to choose a channel from all parallel channel to the
next node in the route. This provides more flexibil-
ity, as an intermediary node can choose an optimal
channel based on balance restrictions.
In our setup, this means that we can not enforce
our probes to be sent through a given channel. The
probe may be forwarded through a parallel channel.
This is also true for all channels along the route. We
accept this as a limitation of our approach.
Note also that while the LN specification (BOLT)
allows non-strict forwarding, the c-lightning imple-
mentation that we use does not allow creating mul-
tiple channels to the same node. The other two
popular implementations, LND and Eclair, allow
parallel channels.
5.4.7 Hanging in-flight HTLCs
Our method assumes that for each probe an er-
ror is returned quickly (within seconds, as Figure 1
shows). If some intermediary hop does not return
an error, we are left with an HTLC that we call
hanging. Hanging HTLCs occupy the capacity of
our channels, preventing us from probing with large
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amounts. In that case, we must issue smaller probes
and, as a result, obtain less information. Hanging
HTLCs are hard to get rid of: the protocol does
not allow to cancel them unilaterally, and closing a
channel involves long timeouts until the funds are
available and can be put into a new channel. This
issue is at the core of the denial-of-service attack
described in [14].
5.5 Estimating the attack cost
The attack requires moderate resources. The at-
tacker only needs to commit funds to open entry
channels. Entry channels’ capacity determine the
maximum amount of probes the attacker can send.
With our current approach, the maximum probing
amount is the protocol’s HTLC limit of 0.167 BTC,
or around 1500 USD at the time of writing. This
is the minimal amount the attacker has to commit
to theoretically be able to fully probe all ”small”
channels. Our experience shows that it is better
to open multiple channels to decrease the negative
effect of hanging HTLCs. In our experiments, we
used five entry channels.
An important feature of our attack is that since
all the probing transactions fail, no fees have to be
paid. The only cost for the attacker is the time
value of money. If no hanging HLTCs are left after
the attack, the attacker can close the entry channels
collaboratively and withdraw the committed funds
immediately. If some HTLCs are hanging, or if the
attacker’s channel partners are offline or unwilling
to cooperate on channel closure, the attacker would
have to wait for the agreed upon timeout (usually on
the order of days). In any case, no funds committed
to the attack are irrevocably lost.
6 Related work
Herrera-Joancomart´ı et al. [12] propose a balance
probing attack. Their approach is similar to ours,
but only allows the attacker to probe the channels
immediately adjacent to the node it has opened a
channel with. In contrast, our algorithm only re-
quires opening a few entry channels for probing the
whole network using arbitrarily long routes.8
Conoscenti et al. [8] analyzed the influence of
hubs on LN and proposed a channel rebalancing
algorithm.
Be´res et at. [7] provided a cryptoeconomic anal-
ysis of LN and argues that despite onion routing
privacy of payments can be breached due to short
routes and strong statistical hints.
Tang et al. [25] showed that introducing noise
in payment channel balances does not bring sub-
stantial improvements in privacy without hurting
routing efficiency.
8Up to the protocol limitation of 20 hops.
Mizrahi and Zohar [14] describe a denial-of-service
attack on LN based on creating and not redeeming
HTLCs along long routes.
7 Conclusion
LN is a promising off-chain scaling solution for Bit-
coin. One of the major issues LN is yet to solve
is routing efficiency: senders must choose routes
with no information on balance distributions, caus-
ing payment failures. Balance information can not
be shares universally because of scalability and pri-
vacy reasons. However, despite the intuitive im-
pression that LN provides a high level of privacy by
using onion routing and not broadcasting transac-
tions, we argue that LN channel balances are not
well protected. Our experiments show that a low-
resource attacker can probe the balances of the ma-
jority of live and active channels, revealing their
balances and potentially tracking the flow of value
through selected channels in near real time. We
implement and evaluate our technique on the Bit-
coin testnet, successfully probing a large portion of
channels. We consider the tradeoff between balance
privacy and routing efficiency, and describe multi-
ple directions for future work that would evaluate
the ways to find the right balance between the two.
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